نقش تعدیلی هزینۀ بدهی در تأثیر روابط اجتماعی مدیرعامل و هیئت مدیره بر برگشت پذیری ساختار سرمایه: واکاوی نظریۀ نمایندگی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
بر اساس نظریه نمایندگی، روابط اجتماعی مدیرعامل و هیئت مدیره می تواند منجر به کاهش نظارت هیئت مدیره شود که بر اساس این امر مدیرعامل ممکن است هنگام اتخاذ تصمیمات استراتژیک سرمایه گذاری منافع شخصی خود را در اولویت قرار دهد. لذا هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تأثیر روابط اجتماعی مدیرعامل و هیئت مدیره بر برگشت پذیری ساختار سرمایه با نقش تعدیلی هزینه بدهی است. فرضیه های پژوهش بر مبنای نمونه آماری متشکل از 112 شرکت طی دوره زمانی 1390 لغایت 1399 با استفاده از رگرسیون چند متغیره مبتنی بر داده های ترکیبی، مورد آزمون قرار گرفت. یافته های پژوهش نشان می دهد مطابق با نظریه نمایندگی، روابط اجتماعی مدیرعامل و هیئت مدیره بر برگشت پذیری ساختار سرمایه، تأثیر منفی و معناداری دارد. همچنین بر اساس یافته های پژوهش، مطابق با نظریه نمایندگی، هزینه بدهی تاثیر روابط اجتماعی مدیرعامل و هیئت مدیره بر برگشت پذیری ساختار سرمایه را تشدید می کند. نتایج بیانگر این است، زمانی که روابط اجتماعی مدیرعامل و هیئت مدیره افزایش یابد، دوره برگشت پذیری ساختار سرمایه کاهش می یابد. همچنین در شرکت های دارای هزینه بدهی بالا با افزایش روابط اجتماعی مدیرعامل و هیئت مدیره از دوره برگشت پذیری ساختار سرمایه بیشتر کاسته می شود.The Moderating Role of Cost of Debt in The Effect of CEO-Board Social Ties on the Capital Structure Reversibility: An Analysis of Agency Theory
According to agency theory, CEO-Board social ties can lead to the reduction of board supervision, according to which, the CEO may prioritize his interests when making strategic investment decisions. Therefore, the current research aims to investigate the effect of the CEO-Board social ties on capital structure reversibility with the moderating role of the cost of debt. The research hypothesis was tested based on a statistical sample consisting of 112 companies from 2011 to 2020 using multivariate regression based on combined data. The findings of the research show that according to the agency theory, the CEO-Board social ties have a negative and significant effect on capital structure reversibility. Also, according to the findings of the research, by the agency theory, the cost of debt intensifies the effect of the CEO-Board social ties on capital structure reversibility. The results indicate that when the CEO-Board social ties increase, the return period of the capital structure decreases. Also, in companies with high cost of debt, with the increase in the CEO-Board social ties, the return period of the capital structure is further reduced. IntroductionCapital, as one of the most important factors of production, has an important role in productive activities and stimulating production, and considering the scarcity of resources in the economy, it is important to determine a suitable index to determine its reversibility or irreversibility (Badavar et al., 2019).Capital structure reversibility can be considered as the time required by the company to reach its initial state before financing and disrupting the initial structure of the company (Focacci, 2017). Capital structure reversibility is considered a financial criterion that will determine the investment return and provide the capital return potential from one investment to analogy for use in several investments (Karimi et al., 2013). The importance of capital structure reversibility is implicitly recognized in analytical theories of investment decisions (Gupta & Rosenthal, 1991).Considering the agency theory and the importance of the board of directors and its impact on the company's investment activities, previous literature has examined how the CEO's social relationships affect the effectiveness of the board of directors and concluded that close personal relationships between the CEO and the board negatively affect the board's ability to monitor the CEO's decision-making process (Larcker et al., 2005; Krishnan et al., 2011; Subrahmanyam, 2008; Westphal, 2014; Fan et. Al., 2019; Nahandi et al., 2019; Yin et al., 2020; Hasan Bhuyan, 2020). The members of the board of directors who have personal relationships with the CEO are less vigilant in monitoring and controlling, and the CEOs have an incentive to allocate resources for private interests. As a result, the effective participation of the board of directors in the strategy formulation process is reduced (Whited & Wu, 2006). Where company managers act as shareholders' brokers, the interests of these two groups may not be aligned and they may pursue different goals, and problems may arise in corporate governance (Rahimian et al., 2016). It is expected that based on the agency theory, due to the CEO-Board social ties and the reduction of the supervisory mechanism of the board of directors, the opportunistic behavior of the CEO will increase, and COEs also have a short-term vision to maximize their interests. Therefore, managers sacrifice long-term benefits for short-term benefits, and as a result, take actions that may reduce the reversibility of the capital structure at the company level.On the other hand, based on agency theory, this relationship may be influenced by the rate of bank facilities and the amount of use of these facilities or the cost of debt by companies. Therefore, the main research question seeks to investigate whether the cost of debt plays a role in the impact of the CEO-Board social ties on capital structure reversibility (Rezaei & Afrouzi, 2015). The reasoning of this question is based on the fact that the increase in agency costs and transaction costs will lead to an increase in financing costs, and CEOs with social relationships with the board of directors in such companies will push investment decisions towards their interests, and these decisions may cause the company to have a slower return on capital. MethodIn terms of purpose, this research is of applied type, in terms of time, it is post-event, and in terms of nature, it is descriptive of the correlation type, which examines the properties and characteristics of the variables and the relationship between the variables by regression analysis. Then, after collecting the data from the statistical population samples, data analysis is done to test the hypotheses. The dependent variable of the current research is capital structure reversibility, the independent variable is the CEO-Board social ties, and the cost of debt is a moderating variable. The first hypothesis of the research states that the CEO-Board social ties have a negative effect on the reversibility of the capital structure. The second hypothesis of the research states that the cost of debt has an aggravating moderating role on the impact of the CEO-Board Social Ties on the reversibility of the capital structure. To collect data, a sample consisting of 112 listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange was selected from 2011 to 2022. Also, to test research hypotheses, multivariate regression with panel data and generalized least squares (GLS) approach and fixed effects method have been used. FindingsThe findings of the research show that according to the agency theory, the CEO-Board social ties, have a negative and significant effect on the capital structure reversibility. Also, according to the findings of the research, by the agency theory, the cost of debt intensifies the effect of the CEO-Board social ties on capital structure reversibility. The results indicate that when the CEO-Board social ties increase, the return period of the capital structure decreases. Also, in companies with high cost of debt, with the increase in the CEO-Board social ties, the return period of the capital structure is further reduced. Results & ConclusionThe results of the research showed in companies with CEO-Board social ties, the speed of reversibility of the capital structure is slower, which means that by reducing the existing informal relations between the CEO and Board, an increase in the reversibility of the capital structure occurs. This finding is in accordance with the prediction of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders based on the agency theory. Managers are aware of favorable investments, while shareholders are not well informed about these opportunities. Therefore, managers use the resulting information asymmetry to pursue their interests and invest in less reversible projects. These findings are consistent with the results reported by Zhang et al. (2020), which stated that the CEO-Board social ties increase agency costs, and the effect of these relations decreases with the increase of shareholders' monitoring. According to their arguments, such relationships increase agency costs.Another finding of the present research is that the cost of debt has a moderating effect on the negative impact of CEO-Board social ties on reversibility of the capital structure and causes the intensification of this negative effect, which means that the increase in the company's loan rate causes a greater negative impact of the CEO-Board social ties on reversibility of the capital structure.According to the signaling theory, one of the reasons for the increase in the company's loans and borrowings is to make the bad situation of the company look good, pay dividends to the shareholders, and attract more investors. According to the findings of the research, despite the high debt cost, the effect of the CEO-Board social ties on the period of the reversibility of the capital structure is increased. The results of the test of this hypothesis are consistent with the research of Manso (2008), which states that debt financing affects investment decisions and creates significant inefficiency. According to the prediction of agency theory, in companies facing high debt costs, financing costs are higher than in other companies, and managers in these companies have a greater tendency for activities with a short-term perspective and personal interests, which affects the investment decision. Managers with a short-term vision to maximize their interests sacrifice long-term benefits for short-term benefits, and as a result, take actions that may reduce the reversibility of the capital structure at the company level. RecommendationsIt is recommended to investors and creditors, when buying shares or lending to companies, in addition to analyzing financial statements and evaluating performance, pay special attention to the reversibility of the capital structure index. Also, according to the findings of this research, the decision regarding the financing of the company has an effect on the reversibility of the capital structure to its initial state, and to provide capital for investments, in line with determining the appropriate financial sources, the management of the company should determine the cost of various sources of financial provision and determines the effects that these financial sources can have on the reversibility of the capital structure in a certain period. Considering the position of the capital structure of the companies in the organizations, it is suggested that the technology management of the Tehran Stock Exchange formulate an option in this regard for all companies and monitor and ensure the correct implementation of related laws.
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